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TRANSACTIONS
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

I. *Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus. Part V. By HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, Esq., Dir. R.A.S.*

Read April 7th, 1827.

INTRODUCTION.

A PRECEDING essay on Indian philosophy* contained a succinct account of the *Carma-mīmāṃsā*. The present one will be devoted to the *Brahma-mīmāṃsā*; which, as the complement of the former, is termed *uttara*, later, contrasted with *pūrva*, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the *védas* in regard to *theology*, as the other is in regard to *works* and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the *védas*, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later *mīmāṃsā* is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but, differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as in a philosophical view.

The ordinary designation of the *uttara mīmāṃsā* is *védānta*, a term likewise of more comprehensive import. It literally signifies "conclusion of the *véda*," and bears reference to the *upanishads*, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the *védas* to which they belong. It implies, however, the doctrine derived from them, and extends to books of sacred

* Vol. i. p. 439.

authority, in which that doctrine is thence deduced; and in this large acception, it is “the end and scope of the *védas*.”

The followers of the *védánta* have separated in several sects, as ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ *védántins*, and bearing other designations. The points on which they disagree, and the difference of their opinions, will not be a subject of the present essay, but may be noticed in a future one.

Among numerous *upanishads*, those which are principally relied upon for the *védánta*, and which accordingly are most frequently cited, are the *Ch’hándógya*, *Caushítací*, *Vrihad-aran’yaca*, *Aitaréyaca*, *Taittiríyaca*, *Cát’haca*, *Cat’havallí*, *Muní’d’aca*, *Pras’na*, *Swétás’watara*; to which may be added the *Iśá-vásya*, *Céna*, and one or two more.

Certain religious exercises, consisting chiefly in profound meditation, with particular sitting postures rigorously continued, are inculcated as preparing the student for the attainment of divine knowledge, and promoting his acquisition of it. Directions concerning such devout exercises are to be found in several of the *upanishads*, especially in the *S’wétás’watara*; and likewise in other portions of the *védas*, as a part of the general ritual. These are accordingly cited by the commentators of the *védánta*; and must be considered to be comprehended under that general term;* and others from different *sáchas* of the *védas*, as further exemplified in a note below.†

Besides the portion of the *védas* understood to be intended by the designation of *védánta*, the grand authority for its doctrine is the collection of *sútras*, or aphorisms, entitled *Brahme-sútra* or *S’áríracá mímánsá*, and sometimes *S’áríra-sútra* or *Védánta-sútra*. *S’áríra*, it should be observed, signifies embodied or incarnate (soul).

Other authorities are the ancient scholia of that text, which is the standard work of the science; and didactic poems comprehended under the designation of *smṛiti*, a name implying a certain degree of veneration due to the authors. Such are the *Bhagavad gítá* and *Yóga-vasishṭ’ha*, reputed to be inspired writings.

* For instance, the *Agni rahasya bráhmāna* of the *Cánwas* and of the *Vájins* (or *Vájas’anéýins*); the *Rahasya bráhmāna* of the *Tándins* and of the *Paingins*.

† The *Udgít’ha-bráhmāna* of the *Vájas’anéýins*, the *Panchágni-vidyá-pracaran’a* of the same, the *Ch’ila grant’ha* of the *Rún’áyaniyas*, the *Prán’a samváda* or *Prán’a vidyá*, *Dahara vidyá*, *Hárda vidyá*, *Paramátma-vidyá*, *Satya vidyá*, *Vaiswánara-vidyá*, *Sún’dilya-vidyá*, *Vámadévyā vidyá*, *Upacós’ala-vidyá*, *Paryanca-vidyá*, *Madhú-vidyá*, *Shód’a’s’acala-vidyá*, *Samvarga-vidyá*, &c.

Writers on the VÉDĀNTA.

The *S'ártraca mímánsá* or *Brahme-sútra*, above-mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms attributed to BĀDARĀYAÑA, who is the same with VYÁSA or *Véda-vyása*; also called *Dwaipáyana* or *Crīshn'a-dwaipáyana*. According to mythology, he had in a former state, being then a *bráhmaṇa* bearing the name of APĀNTARA-TAMAS,* acquired a perfect knowledge of revelation and of the divinity, and was consequently qualified for eternal beatitude. Nevertheless, by special command of the deity, he resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was compiler of the *védas*, as his title of *Vyása* implies.

In the *Purán'as*, and by PARÁS'ARA, he is said to be an incarnation (*avatára*) of VISHNÚ. This, however, is not altogether at variance with the foregoing legend; since APĀNTARA-TAMAS, having attained perfection, was identified with the deity; and his resumption of the human form was a descent of the god, in mythological notions.

Apart from mythology, it is not to be deemed unlikely, that the person (whoever he really was) who compiled and arranged the *védas*, was led to compose a treatise on their scope and essential doctrine. But VYÁSA is also reputed author of the *Mahábhārata*, and most of the principal *purán'as*; and that is for the contrary reason improbable, since the doctrine of the *purán'as*, and even of the *Bhagavad gítá* and the rest of the *Mahábhārata*, are not quite consonant to that of the *védas*, as expounded in the *Brahme sútras*. The same person would not have deduced from the same premises such different conclusions.

The name of BĀDARĀYAÑA frequently recurs in the *sútras* ascribed to him, as does that of JAININI, the reputed author of the *Púrva mímánsá*, in his. I have already remarked, in the preceding essay,† on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in literature or science of other nations: but a Hindu commentator will account for it, by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher.

Besides BĀDARĀYAÑA himself, and his great predecessor JAININI, several other distinguished names likewise occur, though less frequently: some which are also noticed in the *Púrva-mímánsá*, as ATRÉYÍ and BĀDARÍ; and

* *Stanc. &c. on Br. Sútr. 3. 3. 32.*

† Vol. i. p. 440.

some which are not there found, as ASMARAT'HYA, AUD'ULÓMI, CÁRSEÑAJINI, and CÁSACRĪTSNA; and the *Yóga* of *Patanjali*, which consequently is an anterior work; as indeed it must be, if its scholiast, as generally acknowledged, be the same VYÁSA who is the author of the aphorisms of the *Uttara mímánsá*.

The *S'áríracā* is also posterior to the atheistical *Sánc'hya* of CAPILA, to whom, or at least to his doctrine, there are many marked allusions in the text.

The atomic system of CAÑÁDE (or, as the scholiast of the *S'áríracā*, in more than one place, contumeliously designates him, CAÑA-BHUJ or CAÑA-BHACSHA) is frequently adverted to for the purpose of confutation; as are the most noted heretical systems, *viz.* the several sects of *Jainas*, the *Bauddhas*, the *Pásupatas* with other classes of *Máhéśwaras*, the *Páncharátras* or *Bhágavatas*, and divers other schismatics.

From this, which is also supported by other reasons, there seems to be good ground for considering the *S'áríracā* to be the latest of the six grand systems of doctrine (*darsana*) in Indian philosophy: later, likewise, than the heresies which sprung up among the Hindus of the military and mercantile tribes (*cshatriya* and *vaiśya*) and which, disclaiming the *Védas*, set up a *Jina* or a *Buddha* for an object of worship; and later even than some, which, acknowledging the *Védas*, have deviated into heterodoxy in their interpretation of the text.

In a separate essay,* I have endeavoured to give some account of the heretical and heterodox sects which the *S'áríracā* confutes; and of which the tenets are explained, for the elucidation of that confutation, in its numerous commentaries. I allude particularly to the *Jainas*, *Bauddhas*, *Chárvácas*, *Pásupatas*, and *Páncharátras*.

The *sútras* of BĀDARÁYAÑA are arranged in four books or lectures (*ádhyáya*), each subdivided into four chapters or quarters (*páda*). Like the aphorisms of the prior *mímánsá*, they are distributed very unequally into sections, arguments, cases, or topics, (*adhicaráña*.) The entire number of *sútras* is 555; of *adhicaráñas*, 191. But in this there is a little uncertainty, for it appears from S'ANCARA, that earlier commentaries subdivided some *adhicaránas*, where he writes the aphorisms in one section.

An *adhicarána* in the later, as in the prior *mímánsá*, consists of five members or parts: 1st. the subject and matter to be explained; 2d. the

* Vol. i. p. 549.

doubt or question concerning it; 3d. the plausible solution or *primá facie* argument: 4th. the answer, or demonstrated conclusion and true solution; 5th. the pertinence or relevancy and connexion.

But in BĀDARĀYAṆA'S aphorisms, as in those of JAİMİNĪ, no *adhicaran'a* is fully set forth. Very frequently the solution only is given by a single *sūtra*, which obscurely hints the question, and makes no allusion to any different plausible solution, nor to arguments in favour of it. More rarely the opposed solution is examined at some length, and arguments in support of it are discussed through a string of brief sentences.

Being a sequel of the prior *mīmāṃsā*, the latter adopts the same distinctions of six sources of knowledge or modes of proof* which are taught by JAİMİNĪ, supplied where he is deficient by the old scholiast. There is, indeed, no direct mention of them in the *Brahme-sūtras*, beyond a frequent reference to oral proof, meaning revelation, which is sixth among those modes. But the commentators make ample use of a logic which employs the same terms with that of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*, being founded on it, though not without amendments on some points. Among the rest, the *Védāntins* have taken the syllogism (*nyāya*) of the dialectic philosophy, with the obvious improvement of reducing its five members to three.† “It consists,” as expressly declared, “of three, not of five parts; “for as the requisites of the inference are exhibited by three members, “two more are superfluous. They are either the proposition, the reason, “and the example; or the instance, the application, and the conclusion.”

In this state it is a perfectly regular syllogism, as I had occasion to remark in a former essay;‡ and it naturally becomes a question, whether the emendation was borrowed from the Greeks, or being sufficiently obvious, may be deemed purely Indian, fallen upon without hint or assistance from another quarter. The improvement does not appear to be of ancient date, a circumstance which favours the supposition of its having been borrowed. The earliest works in which I have found it mentioned are of no antiquity.§

The logic of the two *mīmāṃsās* merits a more full examination than the limits of the present essay allow, and it has been reserved for a separate consideration at a future opportunity, because it has been refined and

* *Védānta Paribhāṣā*.

† *V. Paribhāṣā*.

‡ Vol. i. p. 116.

§ In the *Védānta Paribhāṣā* and *Padārtha dīpikā*.

brought into a regular form by the followers, rather than by the founders of either school.

The *śáriraca sūtras* are in the highest degree obscure, and could never have been intelligible without an ample interpretation. Hinting the question or its solution, rather than proposing the one or briefly delivering the other, they but allude to the subject. Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, they must from the first have been accompanied by the author's exposition of the meaning, whether orally taught by him or communicated in writing.

Among ancient scholiasts of the *Brahme-sūtras* the name of BAUDHĀYANA occurs: an appellation to which reverence, as to that of a saint or *rishi*, attaches. He is likewise the reputed author of a treatise on law. An early gloss, under the designation of *vṛitti*, is quoted without its author's name, and is understood to be adverted to in the remarks of later writers, in several instances, where no particular reference is however expressed. It is apparently BAUDHĀYANA'S. An ancient writer on both *mīmāṃsās* (prior and later) is cited, under the name of UPAVARSHA, with the epithet of venerable (*bhagavat*),* implying that he was a holy personage. He is noticed in the supplement to the *Amera-cōsha*† as a saint (*muni*), with the titles or additions of *Hala-bhrīti*, *Crita-cōt'i*, and *Ayachita*. It does not appear that any of his works are now forthcoming.

The most distinguished scholiast of these *sūtras*, in modern estimation, is the celebrated S'ANCARA ĀCHĀRYA, the founder of a sect among Hindus which is yet one of the most prevalent. I have had a former occasion of discussing the antiquity of this eminent person; and the subject has been since examined by RĀMA MÓHEN RĀYA and by Mr. Wilson.‡ I continue of opinion, that the period when he flourished may be taken to have been the close of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century of the Christian era; and I am confirmed in it by the concurring opinions of those very learned persons.

How much earlier the older scholia were, or the text itself, there is no evidence to determine. If the reputed author be the true one, it would be necessary to go back nearly two thousand years, to the era of the arrangement of the *védas* by VYĀSA.

S'ANCARA'S gloss or perpetual commentary of the *sūtras* bears the title of

* *Sanc.* 3. 3. 53.

† *Tricánd. sesh.*

‡ *Sans. Dict.*, pref. xvi.

S'áriraca-mímánsá-bhášhya. It has been annotated and interpreted by a herd of commentators; and among others, and most noted, by VÁCHESPATI MIS'RA, in the *Bhámati* or *S'áriraca-bhášhya-vibhága*.

This is the same VÁCHESPATI, whose commentaries on the *Sánc'hya-cáricá* of IS'WARA CHANDRA, and on the text and gloss of PATANJALI'S *Yóga* and GÓTAMA'S *Nyáya*, were noticed in former essays.* He is the author of other treatises on dialectics (*Nyáya*), and of one entitled (*Tatwa-vindu*) on the *púrva mímánsá*, as it is expounded by BHAT'T'A. All his works, in every department, are held in high and deserved estimation.

VÁCHESPATI'S exposition of S'ANCARA'S gloss, again, has been amply annotated and explained in the *Védánta-calpataru* of ANALÁNANDA, surnamed *Vyásásrama*; whose notes, in their turn, become the text for other scholia: especially a voluminous collection under the title of *Parimala*, or *Védánta-calpataru-parimala*, by APYÁYA-DÍCSHITA (author of several other works); and an abridged one, under that of *Védánta-calpataru-manjarí*, by VIDYÁNAT'HA-BHAT'T'A.

Other commentaries on S'ANCARA'S gloss are numerous and esteemed, though not burdened with so long a chain of scholia upon scholia: for instance, the *Brahma-vidyábharaṇa* by ADWAITÁNANDA,† and the *Bhášhya-ratna-prabhá* by GÓVINDÁNANDA: both works of acknowledged merit.

These multiplied expositions of the text and of the gloss furnish an inexhaustible fund of controversial disquisition, suited to the disputatious schoolmen of India. On many occasions, however, they are usefully consulted, in succession, for annotations supplying a right interpretation of obscure passages in S'ANCARA'S scholia or in VYASA'S text.

Another perpetual commentary on the *sútras* of the *S'áriraca* by a distinguished author, is the work of the celebrated RÁMÁNUJA, the founder of

* Vol. i. pp. 24, 25, 93.

† It is by Mr. Ward named *védánta sūtra vyáçhyá* by BRAHME-VIDYÁBHARAN'A, mistaking the title of the work for the appellation of the author. Yet it is expressly affirmed in the rubric and colophon to be the work of ADWAITÁNANDA, who abridged it from an ampler commentary by RÁMÁNANDA TÍRT'HA. The mistake is the more remarkable, as the same ADWAITÁNANDA was preceptor of SADÁNANDA, whose work, the *védánta-sára*, Mr. Ward attempted to translate; and the only part of SADÁNANDA'S preface, which is preserved in the version, is that preceptor's name. Mr. Ward's catalogue of treatises extant belonging to this school of philosophy exhibits other like errors. He puts *Múdhava* for *Madhusúdana*, the name of an author; converts a commentary (the *muctávalí*) into an abridgment; and turns the text (*múla*) of the *védánta-sára* into its essence. *Ward's Hindus*, vol. iv. pp. 172, 173.

a sect which has sprung as a schism out of the *Védántin*. The points of doctrine, on which these great authorities differ, will be inquired into in another place. It may be readily supposed that they are not unfrequently at variance in the interpretation of the text, and I shall, therefore, make little use of the scholia of RÁMÁNUJA for the present essay. For the same reason, I make no reference to the commentaries of BALLABHA A'CHÁRYA, BHAT'TA BHÁSCARA, ANANTA TÍRT'HA surnamed MADHU, and NÍLACANT'HA, whose interpretations differ essentially on some points from S'ANCARA's.

Commentaries on the *S'áríracā sūtras* by authors of less note are extremely numerous. I shall content myself with naming such only as are immediately under view, *viz.* the *Védánta-sūtra-muktāvali* by BRAHMÁNANDA-SARASWATÍ;* the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāshya* or *Mīmāṃsā-bhāshya*, by BHÁSCARÁCHÁRYA; the *Védánta-sūtra-vyáç'hya-chandricá*, by BHAVADÉVA MIS'RA; the *Vyása-sūtra-vṛtti*, by RANGANÁT'HA; the *Subódhiní* or *S'áríra-sūtra sārart'ha chandricá*, by GANGÁDHARA; and the *Brahmámṛita-vershin'i*, by RÁMÁNANDA.

This list might with ease be greatly enlarged. Two of the commentaries, which have been consulted in progress of preparing the present essay, are without the author's name, either in preface or colophon, in the only copies which I have seen; and occasions have occurred for noticing authors of commentaries on other branches of philosophy, as well as on the *Brahma mīmāṃsā* (for instance, VIJNYANA BHICSHU, author of the *Sānc'hya-sāra* and *Yōga-vártica*).†

To these many and various commentaries in prose, on the text and on the scholia, must be added more than one in verse. For instance, the *Sançshépa-s'áríracā*, which is a metrical paraphrase of text and gloss, by SARVAJNYÁTMA-GIRA a *sannyāsi*: it is expounded by a commentary entitled *Anwayart'ha-pracás'icá*, by RÁMA TÍRT'HA, disciple of CRISHNA TÍRT'HA, and author of several other works; in particular, a commentary on the *Upadéśa-sahasrī*, and one on the *Védánta-sāra*.

Besides his great work, the interpretation of the *sūtras*, S'ANCARA wrote commentaries on all the principal or important *Upanishads*. His preceptor, GÓVINDA, and the preceptor's teacher, GAUD'APÁDA, had already written commentaries on many of them.

S'ANCARA is author, likewise, of several distinct treatises; the most noted

* Mr. Ward calls this an abridgment of the *Védánta-sūtras*. It is no abridgment, but a commentary in ordinary form.

† Vol. i. p. 22.

of which is the *Upadésa-sahasrí*, a metrical summary of the doctrine deduced by him from the *Upanishads* and *Brahma-sútras*, in his commentaries on those original works. The text of the *Upadésa-sahasrí* has been expounded by more than one commentator; and among others by RÁMA TÍRT'HA, already noticed for his comment on the *Sancshépa-sáríracā*. His gloss of the *Upadésa-sahasrí* is entitled *Pada-yójanicā*.

Elementary treatises on the *Védānta* are very abundant. It may suffice to notice a few which are popular and in general use, and which have been consulted in the preparation of the present essay.

The *Védānta-paribhāshā* of DHARMA-RÁJA DÍCSHITA explains, as its title indicates, the technical terms of the *Védānta*; and, in course of doing so, opens most of the principal points of its doctrine. A commentary on this work by the author's son, RÁMA-CRĪSHNÁ DÍCSHITA, bears the title of *Védānta-śic'hāmani*. Taken together, they form an useful introduction to the study of this branch of Indian philosophy.

The *Védānta-sāra* is a popular compendium of the entire doctrine of the *Védānta*.* It is the work of SADĀNANDA, disciple of ADWAYĀNANDA or ADWAITĀNANDA before-mentioned, and has become the text for several

* Mr. Ward has given, in the fourth volume of his *View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus* (third edition), a translation of the *Védānta-sāra*. I wish to speak as gently as I can of Mr. Ward's performance; but having collated this, I am bound to say it is no version of the original text, and seems to have been made from an oral exposition through the medium of a different language, probably the Bengalese. This will be evident to the oriental scholar on the slightest comparison: for example, the introduction, which does not correspond with the original in so much as a single word, the name of the author's preceptor alone excepted; nor is there a word of the translated introduction countenanced by any of the commentaries. At the commencement of the treatise, too, where the requisite qualifications of a student are enumerated, Mr. Ward makes his author say, that a person possessing those qualifications is heir to the *vēda* (p. 176). There is no term in the text, nor in the commentaries, which could suggest the notion of heir; unless Mr. Ward has so translated *adhicári* (a competent or qualified person), which in Bengalese signifies proprietor, or, with the epithet *uttara* (*uttarādhicári*), heir or successor. It would be needless to pursue the comparison further. The meaning of the original is certainly not to be gathered from such translations of this and (as Mr. Ward terms them) of other principal works of the Hindus, which he has presented to the public.

I was not aware, when preparing the former essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus which have been inserted in the first volume of *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, that Mr. Ward had treated the same topics: but I think it now unnecessary to revert to the subject, for the purpose of offering any remarks on his explanation of other branches of Indian philosophy.

commentaries; and, among the rest, the *Vidwan-manó-ranjini*, by RÁMA-TÍRT'HA, who has been already twice noticed for other works; and the *Subódhini*, by NŖSINHA SARASWATÍ, disciple of CRĪSHNÁNANDA.

A few other treatises may be here briefly noticed.

The *S'ástra-siddhánta-léśa-sangraha*, by APYAYA or (APYAI) *dícshita*, son of RANGANÁT'HA or RANGARÁJA *dícshita*, and author of the *Parimala* on the *Siddhánta Calpataru*, before-mentioned, as well as of other works, has the benefit of a commentary, entitled *Crĭshnálanácára*, by ACHYUTA CRĪSHNÁNANDA TÍRT'HA, disciple of SWAYAM-PRACÁS'ÁNANDA SARASWATÍ. The *Védánta-siddhánta-vindu*, by MADHUSÚDANA, disciple of VIS'WÉS'WARÁNANDA *saraswatí*, and author of the *Védánta-calpa-laticá* and of other works, is in like manner commented on by BRAHMÁNANDA, disciple of NÁRÁYAÑA TÍRT'HA.

*Analysis.**

The *uttara mímánsá* opens precisely as the *púrva*, announcing the purport in the same terms, except a single, but most important word, *brahmé* instead of *dharma*. 'Next, therefore, the inquiry is concerning God.'† It proceeds thus: '[He is that] whence are the birth and [continuance, and dissolution] of this [world]: [He is] the source of [revelation or] holy ordinance.‡ That is, as the commentators infer from these aphorisms so expounded, 'He is the omnipotent creator of the world and the omniscient author of revelation.' It goes on to say, 'This appears from the import and right construction of holy writ.'||

The author of the *sútras* next§ enters upon a confutation of the *Sánc'hya*s, who insist that *nature*, termed *prad'hána*, which is the material cause of the universe, as they affirm, is the same with the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the world recognised by the *védas*. It is not so; for 'wish' (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause, which moreover is termed (*átman*) soul: 'He wished to be many and prolific, and became manifold.' And again, 'He desired to be many, &c.....'¶ Therefore he is a sentient rational being; not insensible, as the *pracṛiti* (nature) or *pradhána* (matter) of CAPILA is affirmed to be.

* In this analysis of the *sútras*, a portion of the scholia or explanations of commentators is blended with the text, for a brief abstract and intelligible summary of the doctrine.

† *Br. Sútr.* 1. 1. § 1.

‡ *Ib.* § 2 and 3.

|| *Ib.* § 4.

§ *Ib.* § 5. (*sútr.* 5. 11.)

¶ *Ch'hándógya*, 6.

In the sequel of the first chapter* questions are raised upon divers passages of the *védas*, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes are seemingly assigned to the world's cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are shown to intend the supreme one.

The cases (*adhicaraanās*) or questions arising on them are examined and resolved concisely and obscurely in the *sūtras*, fully and perspicuously in the scholia.

“ The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is (*ananda-maya*) essentially happy.† He is the brilliant, golden person, seen *within* (*antar*) the solar orb and the human eye.‡ He is the *etherial* element (*dcāśa*), from which all things proceed and to which all return.§ He is the *breath* (*prāṇa*) in which all beings merge, into which they all rise.|| He is the *light* (*jyōtish*) which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, every where throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the *breath* (*prāṇa*) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, with which INDRA, in a dialogue with PRATARDANA, identifies himself.¶

The term *prāṇa*, which is the subject of two of the sections just quoted (§ 9 and 11), properly and primarily signifies respiration, as well as certain other vital actions (inspiration, energy, expiration, digestion, or circulation of nourishment); and secondarily, the senses and organs.** But, in the passages here referred to, it is employed for a different signification, intending the supreme *Brahme*; as also in divers other texts of the *védas*: and, among the rest, in one where the senses are said to be absorbed into it during profound sleep;†† for ‘ while a man sleeps without dreaming, his soul is with *Brahme*.’

Further cases of the like nature, but in which the indications of the true meaning appear less evident, are discussed at length in the second and third chapters of the first book. Those in which the distinctive attributes of the supreme being are more positively indicated by the passage whereon a question arises, had been considered in the foregoing chapter: they are not so clearly denoted in the passages now examined. Such as concern God as the object of devout meditation and worship, are for the most part collected in the

* § 6 to § 11.

† *Taittirīya*.

‡ *Ch'hándógya*, 1.

§ *Ch'hándógya*, 1.

|| *Udgí'ha*.

¶ *Caushítaci*.

** *Br. Sutr.* 2. 4. § 1, 6. (§ 1, 13.)

†† *Sanc. &c. on Br. Sutr.* 1. 1. § 9.

second chapter : those which relate to God as the object of knowledge, are reserved for the third. Throughout these cases, completed where requisite by the scholiast, divers interpretations of a particular term or phrase are first proposed, as obvious and plausible, and reasons favourable to the proposed explanation set forth ; but are set aside by stronger arguments, for a different and opposite construction. The reasoning is here omitted, as it would need much elucidation ; and the purpose of this analysis is to exhibit the topics treated, and but summarily the manner of handling them.

It is not the embodied (*śárīra*) and individual soul, but the supreme *Brahme* himself,* on whom devout meditation is to be fixed, as enjoined in a passage which declares : ‘ this universe is indeed *Brahme* ;* for it springs from him, merges in him, breathes in him : therefore, serene, worship him. Verily, a devout man, as are his thoughts or deeds in this world, such does he become departing hence [in another birth]. Frame then the devout meditation, “ a living body endued with mind.....”†

It is neither fire nor the individual soul, but the supreme being, who is the ‘devourer’ (*attri*) described in the dialogue between YAMA and NĀCHICĒTAS:‡ ‘ who, then, knows where abides that being, whose food is the priest and the soldier (and all which is fixt or moveable), and death is his sauce ?’

In the following passage, the supreme spirit, and not the intellectual faculty, is associated with the individual living soul, as “ two occupying the cavity or ventricle of the heart ” (*guhām pravishtau átmanau*). ‘ Theologists, as well as worshippers maintaining sacred fires, term light and shade the contrasted two, who abide in the most excellent abode, worthy of the supreme, occupying the cavity (of the heart), dwelling together in the worldly body, and tasting the certain fruit of good (or of evil) works.’§

In the following extract from a dialogue,¶ in which SATYACĀMA instructs UPACÓS’ALA, the supreme being is meant ; not the reflected image in the eye, nor the informing deity of that organ, nor the regent of the sun, nor

* *Brahman* is, in this acceptation, a neuter noun (nom. *Brahme* or *Brahma*) ; and the same term in the masculine (nom. *Brahmā*), is one of the three gods who constitute one person. But it is more conformable with our idiom to employ the masculine exclusively, and many Sanscrit terms of the same import are masculine ; as *Paramâtman*-(*tmā*), *Paramés’wara*, &c.

† *Ch’hándógya*, 3. *Sún’d’ilya vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 1. (S. 1, 8.)

‡ *Cat’havallí*, 2. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 2. (S. 9, 10). § *Cat’havallí*, 3. *Br. S.* 1. 2. § 3. (S. 11, 12.)

¶ *Ch’hándógya*, 4. *Upacósala-vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 4. (S. 13, 17.)

the individual intelligent soul. 'This being, who is seen in the eye, is the self (*átman*): He is immortal, fearless *Brahme*. Though liquid grease, or water, be dropped therein, it passes to the corners (leaving the eye-ball undefiled).

So, in a dialogue, in which YÁJNYAWALCYA instructs UDDÁLACA,* "the internal check" (*antaryámin*) is the supreme being; and not the individual soul, nor the material cause of the world, nor a subordinate deity, the conscious informing regent of the earth, nor a saint possessing transcendent power: where premising, 'he who internally restrains (or governs) this and the other world, and all beings therein,' the instructor goes on to say: 'who standing in the earth is other than the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who interiorly restrains (and governs) the earth: the same is thy soul (and mine), the "internal check" (*antaryámin*), immortal, &c.'

Again, in another dialogue, ANGIRAS, in answer to MAHÁSÁLA, who with SAUNACA visited him for instruction, declares 'there are two sciences, one termed inferior, the other superior. The inferior comprises the four *védas*, with their appendages, grammar, &c.' (all of which he enumerates): 'but the superior (or best and most beneficial) is that by which the unalterable (being) is comprehended, who is invisible (imperceptible by organs of sense), ungrasped (not prehensible by organs of action), come of no race, belonging to no tribe, devoid of eye, ear (or other sensitive organ), destitute of hand, foot (or other instrument of action), everlasting lord, present every where, yet most minute. Him, invariable, the wise contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the head and body grows from the living man, so does the universe come of the unalterable.....' Here it is the supreme being, not nature or a material cause, nor an embodied individual soul, who is the invisible (*adrés'ya*) ungrasped source of (all) beings (*bhúta-yóni*).

In a dialogue between several interlocutors, PRÁCHÍNASÁLA, UDDÁLACA, and AS'WAPATI, king of the *Caicéyis*, (of which a version at length was inserted in an essay on the *védas*, As. Res. vol. viii. p. 446), the terms *vaiśwánara* and *átman* occur (there translated universal soul). The ordinary acceptation of

* *Vrihad áran'yaca*, 5. Br. *Sútr.* 1. 2. § 5. (S. 18, 20.)

† *Mun'daca*, an *upanishad* of the *At'havana*. Br. *Sútr.* 1. 2. § 6. (S. 21, 23.)

vaiśvānara is fire : and it is therefore questioned, whether the element of fire be not here meant, or the regent of fire, that is, the conscious, informing deity of it, or a particular deity described as having an igneous body, or animal heat designated as alvine fire ; and whether likewise *ātman* intends the living, individual soul, or the supreme being. The answer is, that the junction of both general terms limits the sense, and restricts the purport of the passage to the single object to which both terms are applicable : it relates, then, to the supreme being.*

Under this section the author twice cites JAIMINI :† once for obviating any difficulty or apparent contradiction in this place, by taking the term in its literal and etymological sense (universal guide of men), instead of the particular acceptance of fire ; and again, as justifying, by a parallel passage in another *véda*,‡ an epithet intimating the minute size of the being in question (*prádés'a-mātra*), a span long.§ On this last point other ancient authors are likewise cited : one, AS'MARAT'HYA, who explains it as the result of shrinking or condensation ; the other, BĀDARI, as a fruit of imagination or mental conception.|| Reference is also made to another *s'ác'há* of the *véda*,¶ where the infinite, supreme soul, is said to occupy the spot between the eye-brows and nose.

‘ That on which heaven and earth and the intermediate transpicuous region are fixt, mind, with the vital airs (or sensitive organs), know to be the one soul (*ātman*) : reject other doctrines. This alone is the bridge of immortality,’** In this passage of an *upanishad* of the *At'havvana*, BRAHME is intended, and not any other supposed site (*áyatana*) of heaven, earth, &c.

In a dialogue between NĀREDA and SANATCUMĀRA, the (*bhúman*) “ great ” one, proposed as an object of inquiry for him who desires unlimited happiness, since there is no bliss in that which is finite and small, is briefly defined. ‘ He is great, in whom nought else is seen, heard, or known : but that wherein ought else is seen, heard, or known, is small.’†† Here the supreme being is meant ; not breath (*prán'a*), which had been previously mentioned as greatest, in a climax of enumerated objects.

* *Ch'hándógyu*, 5. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 7. (S. 24, 32.)

† *Ib.* S. 28 and 31.

‡ *Vájasaneyi brāhmana*.

§ By an oversight, the expression relative to diminutive dimension was omitted in the translated passage.

|| *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. 29. 30.

¶ *Jábála*.

** *Mun'daca. Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 1. (S. 1, 7.)

†† *Ch'hándógya*, 7. *Bhúmaavidyá. Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 2. (S. 8, 9.)

So, in a dialogue between YÁJNYAWALCYA and his wife GÁRGÍ,* being asked by her, ‘the heaven above, and the earth beneath, and the transpicious region between, and all which has been, is, and will be, whereon are they woven and sewn?’ answers, the ether (*ácás’a*); and being further asked, what it is on which ether is woven or sewn? replies, ‘the unvaried being, whom *Brāhmanas* affirm to be neither coarse nor subtile, neither short nor long.....’ It is the supreme being who is here meant.

‘The mystic syllable *óm*, composed of three elements of articulation, is a subject of devout meditation; and the efficacy of that meditation depends on the limited or extended sense in which it is contemplated. The question concerning this mode of worship is discussed in a dialogue between PIPPALÁDA and SATYACÁMA.†

If the devotion be restricted to the sense indicated by one element, the effect passes not beyond this world; if to that indicated by two of the elements, it extends to the lunar orb, whence however the soul returns to a new birth; if it be more comprehensive, embracing the import of the three elements of the word, the ascent is to the solar orb, whence, stripped of sin, and liberated as a snake which has cast its slough, the soul proceeds to the abode of *Brahme*, and to the contemplation of (*purusha*) him who resides in a corporeal frame: that is, soul reposing in body (*puri-s’aya*).

That mystic name, then, is applied either to the supreme BRAHME, uniform, with no quality or distinction of parts; or to BRAHME, not supreme, but an effect (*cárya*) diversified, qualified; who is the same with the *Viráj* and *Hiran’ya-garbha* of mythology, born in the mundane egg.

It appears from the latter part of the text, that it is the supreme BRAHME to whom meditation is to be directed, and on whom the thoughts are to be fixed, for that great result of liberation from sin and worldly trammels.

In a passage descriptive of the lesser ventricle of the heart, it is said: ‘within this body (*Brahme-pura*) Brahme’s abode, is a (*dahara*) little lotus, a dwelling within which is a (*dahara*) small vacuity occupied by ether (*ácás’a*). What that is which is within (the heart’s ventricle) is to be inquired, and should be known.‡ A question is here raised, whether that ‘ether’

* *Vṛih. Arany.* 5. *Br. Sūtr.* 1. 3. § 3. (S. 10, 12.)

† *Prasna*, an *upanishad* of the *At’harcana*. *Br. Sūtr.* 1. 3. § 4. (S. 13.)

‡ *Ch’hándúgya*, 8. *Dahara-vidyā*. *Br. Sūtr.* 1. 3. § 5. (S. 14, 21.)

(*ácás'a*) within the ventricle of the heart be the etherial element, or the individual sensitive soul, or the supreme one; and it is pronounced from the context, that the supreme being is here meant.

'The sun shines not therein, nor the moon, nor stars: much less this fire. All shines after his effulgence (reflecting his light), by whose splendour this whole (world) is illumined.* In this passage it is no particular luminary or mine of light, but the (*prajnya*) intelligent soul (supreme *Brahme*) which shines with no borrowed light.

In the dialogue between YAMA and NACHICÉTAS, before cited, are the following passages.† 'A person (*purusha*) no bigger than the thumb abides in the midst of self;' and again, 'the person no bigger than the thumb is clear as a smokeless flame, lord of the past (present) and future; he is to-day and will be to-morrow: such is he (concerning whom you inquire).' This is evidently said of the supreme ruler, not of the individual living soul.

Another passage of the same *upanishad* ‡ declares: 'this whole universe, issuing from breath (*prána*), moves as it impels: great, terrible, as a clap of thunder. They, who know it, become immortal.' *Brahme*, not the thunderbolt nor wind, is here meant.

'The living soul (*samprasada*) rising from this corporeal frame, attains the supreme light, and comes forth with his identical form.'§ It is neither the light of the sun, nor the visual organ, but BRAHME, that is here meant.

'Ether (*ácás'a*) is the bearer (cause of bearing) of name and form. That, in the midst of which they both are, is BRAHME: it is immortality; it is soul.'|| *A'cás'a* here intends the supreme being, not the element so named.

In a dialogue between YÁJNYAWALCYA and JANACA,¶ in answer to an inquiry 'which is the soul?' the intelligent internal light within the heart is declared to be so. This likewise is shown to relate to the supreme one, unaffected by worldly course.

It had been intimated in an early aphorism of the first chapter, that the *védas*, being rightly interpreted, do concur in the same import, as there

* *Mun'daca*, *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 6. (S. 22, 23.) † *Cát'ha*. 4. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 7. (S. 24, 25.)

‡ *Cát'ha*, 6. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 10. (S. 39).

§ *Ch'hándógya* 8. *Prajápati vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 11. (S. 40.)

|| *Ib.* ad finem, *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 12. (S. 41.)

¶ *Trīhad Aran'yaca*, 6. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 13. (S. 42, 43.)

expressed, concerning the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe.* An objection to this conclusion is raised, upon the ground of discrepancy remarked in various texts of the *védas*,† which coincide, indeed, in ascribing the creation to BRAHME, but differ in the order and particulars of the world's development. The apparent contradiction is reconciled, as they agree on the essential points of the creator's attributes; omnipotent and omniscient providence, lord of all, soul of all, and without a second, &c.: and it was not the object of the discrepant passages to declare the precise succession and exact course of the world's formation.

Two more sections are devoted to expound passages which define BRAHME as creator, and which are shown to comport no other construction. In one,‡ cited from a dialogue between AJÁTAS'ATRU and BÁLÁCI, surnamed GÁRGYA, the object of meditation and worship is pronounced to be, 'he who was the maker of those persons just before mentioned (regents of the sun, moon, &c.), and whose work this universe is.'

In the other, cited from a dialogue between YÁJNYAWALCYA and MAITRÉYI,§ soul, and all else which is desirable, are contrasted as mutual objects of affection: 'it is for soul (*átman*) that opulence, kindred, and all else which is dear, are so; and thereunto soul reciprocally is so; and such is the object which should be meditated, inquired, and known, and by knowledge of whom all becomes known.' This, it is shown, is said of the supreme, not of the individual soul, nor of the breath of life.

Under this last head several authorities are quoted by the author, for different modes of interpretation and reasoning, *viz.* ASMARAT'HYA, AUDULÓMI and CASACRISTNA, as JAIMINI under the next preceding (§ 5).

The succeeding section|| affirms the important tenet of the *Védánta*, that the supreme being is the material, as well as the efficient, cause of the universe: it is a proposition directly resulting from the tenour of passages of the *védas*, and illustrations and examples adduced.

The first lecture is terminated by an aphorism,¶ intimating that, in the like manner as the opinion of a plastic nature and material cause (termed by the *Sánc'hya*s, *pradhána*) has been shown to be unsupported by the

* Br. S. 1. 1. § 4.

† Ch'hándógya, Taittiriya, and Aitareya.

‡ *Caushítací Bráhma*na. Br. S. 1. 4. § 5. (S. 16-18.)

§ *Vṛihad Aranyaca*, *Maitréyi bráhma*na. Br. Sútr. 1. 4. § 6. (S. 19-22.)

|| Br. Sútr. 1. 4. § 7. (S. 23-27.)

¶ Ibid. § 8 (S. 28.)

text of the *Véda*, and inconsistent with its undoubted doctrine, so, by the like reasoning, the notion of atoms (*an'u* or *paramán'u*) and that of an universal void (*s'unya*), and other as unfounded systems, are set aside in favour of the only consistent position just now affirmed. (*Br. Sûtr.* 1.1. § 5 and 1.4. § 7.)

Not to interrupt the connexion of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digression, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this chapter,* wherein it is inquired whether any besides a regenerate man (or Hindu of the three first tribes) is qualified for theological studies and theognostic attainments; and the solution of the doubt is, that a *s'udra*, or man of an inferior tribe, is incompetent;† and that beings superior to man (the gods of mythology) are qualified.

In the course of this disquisition the noted question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favourite topic in both *mímánsás*, being intimately connected with that of the eternity of the *véda*, or revelation acknowledged by them.

I shall not, however, enter into the matter further, in this place, though much remain to be added to the little which was said on it in a former essay.‡

In the fourth chapter of the first lecture, the author returns to the task of confuting the *Sánc'hya* doctrine; and some passages of the *védas*, apparently favouring that doctrine, are differently interpreted by him: 'the indistinct one (*avyacta*) is superior to the great one (*mahat*), and embodied soul (*purusha*) is superior to the indistinct.'§ Here the very same terms, which the *Sánc'hya*s employ for 'intelligence, nature and soul,' are contrasted, with allusion seemingly to the technical acceptations of them. This passage is, however, explained away; and the terms are taken by the *Védántins* in a different sense.

The next instance is less striking and may be briefly dismissed, as may that following it: one relative to *ajá*, alleged to signify in the passage in question|| the *unborn* sempiternal nature (*pracríti*), but explained to intend a *luminous nature* (*pracríti*) noticed in the *Ch'hándógya*; (there is in the text itself an evident allusion to the ordinary acceptance of the word, a

* *Br. Sûtr.* 1. 3. § 8, 9. (S. 26-38.)

† *Br. Sûtr.* 1. 3. (S. 28-29.)

‡ Vol. 1. p. 446.

§ *Cát'ha* 3. *Br. Sûtr.* 1. 4. § 1. (S. 1-7.)

|| *Swétáswatara. B.S.* 1. 4. § 2. (S. 8-10.)

she-goat) : the other concerning the meaning of the words *pancha-panchajanaḥ*, in a passage of the *Vṛihad Aranyaca*,* which a follower of the *Sānc'hya* would construe as bearing reference to five times five (twenty-five) principles ; but which clearly relates to five objects specified in the context, and figuratively termed persons (*pancha-jana*).

It is because the *Sānc'hya* doctrine is, in the apprehension of the *Védāntins* themselves, to a certain degree plausible, and seemingly countenanced by the text of the *Védas*, that its refutation occupies so much of the attention of the author and his scholiasts. More than one among the sages of the law (DÉVALA in particular is named) have sanctioned the principles of the *Sānc'hya* ; and they are not uncountenanced by MENU.† CAPILA himself is spoken of with the reverence due to a saint (*Mahā-Rīshi*) and inspired sage ; and his most eminent disciples, as PANCHAS'IC'HA, &c. are mentioned with like veneration ; and their works are dignified with the appellations of *tantra* and *smṛiti* as holy writings, by the *Védāntins*, at the same time that these oppose and refute the doctrine taught by him.

CAPILA, indeed, is named in the *Véda* itself as possessing transcendent knowledge : but here it is remarked, that the name has been borne by more than one sage ; and in particular by VÁSUDÉVA, who slew the sons of SAGARA.‡ This mythological personage, it is contended, is the CAPILA named in the *Véda*.

The second lecture continues the refutation of CAPILA's *Sānc'hya*, which, it is observed, is at variance with the *smṛitis*, as with the *Védas* : and here the name of MENU is placed at the head of them, although the institutes, which bear his name, will be found, as just now hinted, and as subsequently admitted in another section, to afford seeming countenance to *Sānc'hya* doctrines. Such passages are, however, explained away by the *Védāntins*, who rely in this instance, as they do in that of the *Véda* itself, on other texts, which are not reconcileable to the *Sānc'hya*.

The same argument is, in the following section,§ applied to the setting aside of the *Yōga-smṛiti* of PATANJALI (*Hairan'ya-garbha*), so far as that is inconsistent with the orthodox tenets deduced from the *Védas* ; and, by parity of reasoning, to CAÑÁDE's atomical scheme ; and to other systems which admit two distinct causes (a material and an efficient one) of the universe.

* *Vṛihad Aran.* 6. Br. S. 1. 4. § 3. (S. 11-13.)

† MENU's Institutes, 12. 50.

‡ *Sānc.* on Br. *Sútr.* 2. 1. § 1. (S. 1-2.)

§ Br. *Sútr.* 2. 1. § 2 (S. 3.)

The doctrine derived from the tenour of the *Védas* is to be supported, likewise, by reasoning independently of authority. ‘The objection, that the cause and effect are dissimilar, is not a valid one: instances of such dissimilarity are frequent. Hair and nails, which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal body; and sentient vermin (scorpions, &c.) spring from inanimate sources (cow-dung, &c.) The argument, too, might be retorted; for, according to the adverse position, sentient beings are produced from an insensible plastic nature.* On these and other arguments the orthodox doctrine is maintainable by reasoning: and by like arguments opinions concerning atoms and an universal void, which are not received by the best persons, may be confuted.†

‘The distinction relative to fruition, discriminating one who enjoys and that which is enjoyed, does not invalidate the singleness and identity of BRAHME as cause and effect.‡ The sea is one and not other than its waters; yet waves, foam, spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it, differ from each other.’

‘An effect is not other than its cause. BRAHME is single without a second. He is not separate from the embodied self. He is soul; and the soul is he.§ Yet he does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rock crystals, red orpiment &c.; the same soil produces a diversity of plants; the same food is converted into various excrescences, hair, nails, &c.

‘As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so is BRAHME variously transformed and diversified, without aid of tools or exterior means of any sort.|| In like manner, the spider spins his web out of his own substance; spirits assume various shapes; cranes (*valáca*) propagate without the male; and the lotus proceeds from pond to pond without organs of motion. That BRAHME is intire without parts, is no objection: he is not wholly transformed into worldly appearances. Various changes are presented to the same dreaming soul. Divers illusory shapes and disguises are assumed by the same spirit.¶

BRAHME is omnipotent, able for every act, without organ or instrument.** No motive or special purpose need be assigned for his creation of the universe, besides his will.††

* *Br Sûtr.* 2. 1. § 3. (S. 4. 11.) † *Ibid.* § 4. (S. 12.) ‡ *Ibid.* § 5. (S. 13.)

§ *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 14-20) and § 7. (S. 21-23.) || *Ibid.* § 8. (S. 24-25.)

¶ *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 26-29.) ** *Ibid.* § 10. (S. 30-31.) †† *Ibid.* § 11. (S. 32-33.)

‘Unfairness and uncompassionateness are not to be imputed to him, because some (the gods) are happy, others (beasts and inferior beings) are miserable, and others again (men) partake of happiness and unhappiness. Every one has his lot, in the renovated world, according to his merits, his previous virtue or vice in a former stage of an universe, which is sempiternal and had no beginning in time. So the rain-cloud distributes rain impartially ; yet the sprout varies according to the seed.’*

‘Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, &c.) exists in BRAHME, who is devoid of qualities.’†

The second chapter of the second lecture is controversial. The doctrine of the *Sānc’hyas* is confuted in the first section ; that of the *Vais’eshikas* in two more ; of the *Bauddhas* in as many ; of the *Jainas* in one ; of the *Pás’u-patas* and *Páncharátras*, likewise, in one each. These controversial disquisitions are here omitted ; as a brief abstract would hardly be intelligible, and a full explanation would lead to too great length. They have been partly noticed in a separate treatise on the Philosophy of Indian Sects (vol. 1. p. 549). It is remarkable, that the *Nyáya* of GÓTAMA is entirely unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the *Védánta-sútras*.

In the third chapter of the second lecture, the task of reconciling seeming contradictions of passages in the *védas* is resumed.

‘The origin of air and the ethereal element (*ácás’a*), unnoticed in the text of the *véda* (*Ch’hándógya*), where the creation of the three other elements is described, has been affirmed in another (*Taittiríyaca*).‡ The omission of the one is supplied by the notice in the other ; there is no contradiction, as the deficient passage is not restrictive, nor professes a complete enumeration. Ether and air are by BRAHME created. But he himself has no origin, no procreator nor maker, for he is eternal, without beginning as without end.§ So fire, and water, and earth, proceed mediately from him, being evolved successively, the one from the other, as fire from air, and this from ether.|| The element of earth is meant in divers passages where food (that is, esculent vegetable) is said to proceed from water: for rain fertilizes the earth. It is by his will, not by their own act, that they are so evolved ; and conversely, they merge one into the other, in the reversed order, and are re-

* *Br. Sútr.* 2. 1. § 12. (S. 34-36.)

† *Ibid.* 2. 3. § 1 and 2. (S. 1-7 and 8.)

|| *Ibid.* § 4-6. (S. 10-12.)

‡ *Ibid.* § 13. (S. 37.)

§ *Ibid.* § 3. (S. 9.)

absorbed at the general dissolution of worlds, previous to renovation of all things.*

‘Intellect, mind, and organs of sense and action, being composed of the primary elements, are evolved and re-absorbed in no different order or succession, but in that of the elements of which they consist.’†

‘The same course, evolution and re-absorption, or material birth and death, cannot be affirmed of the soul. Birth and death are predicated of an individual, referring merely to his association with body, which is matter fixed or moveable. Individual souls are, in the *véda*, compared to sparks issuing from a blazing fire; but the soul is likewise declared expressly to be eternal and unborn. Its emanation is no birth, nor original production.‡ It is perpetually intelligent and constantly sensible, as the *Sānc’hyas* too maintain; not adventitiously so, merely by association with mind and intellect, as the disciples of CANÁDE insist. It is for want of sensible objects, not for want of sensibility or faculty of perception, that the soul feels not during profound sleep, fainting, or trance.

‘The soul is not of finite dimensions, as its transmigrations seemingly indicate; nor minutely small abiding within the heart, and no bigger than the hundredth part of a hundredth of a hair’s point, as in some passages described; but, on the contrary, being identified with supreme BRAHME, it participates in his infinity.’§

‘The soul is active; not, as the *Sānc’hyas* maintain, merely passive.|| Its activity, however, is not essential, but adventitious. As the carpenter, having his tools in hand, toils and suffers, and laying them aside, rests and is easy, so the soul in conjunction with its instruments (the senses and organs) is active, and quitting them, reposes.¶

‘Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in its actions and fruition, in its attainment of knowledge and consequent liberation and bliss, by the supreme ruler of the universe,** who causes it to act conformably with its previous resolves: now, according to its former purposes, as then consonantly to its yet earlier predispositions, accruing from preceding forms with no retrospective limit; for the world had no beginning. The supreme soul makes the individuals act relatively to their virtuous or vicious

* *Br. Sútr.* 2. 3. § 7-8. (S. 13-14.)

† *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 15.)

‡ *Ibid.* § 10-11. (S. 16-17.)

§ *Ibid.* § 13. (S. 19-32.)

|| *Ibid.* § 14. (S. 33-39.)

¶ *Ibid.* § 15. (S. 40.)

** *Ibid.* § 16. (S. 41-42.)

propensities, as the same fertilizing rain-cloud causes various seeds to sprout multifariously, producing diversity of plants according to their kind.

‘The soul is a portion of the supreme ruler,* as a spark is of fire. The relation is not as that of master and servant, ruler and ruled, but as that of whole and part. In more than one hymn and prayer of the *véda*† it is said, “all beings constitute one quarter of him; three quarters are imperishable in heaven:” and in the *Iśwara-gíta*‡ and other *smṛitis*, the soul, that animates body, is expressly affirmed to be a portion of him. He does not, however, partake of the pain and suffering of which the individual soul is conscious, through sympathy, during its association with body; so solar or lunar light appears as that which it illumines, though distinct therefrom.

‘As the sun’s image reflected in water is tremulous, quaking with the undulations of the pool, without however affecting other watery images nor the solar orb itself; so the sufferings of one individual affect not another, nor the supreme ruler. But, according to the doctrine of the *Sānc’hya*s, who maintain that souls are numerous, each of them infinite, and all affected by one plastic principle, nature (*pradhāna* or *pracrīti*), the pain or pleasure, which is experienced by one, must be felt by all. The like consequence is objected to the doctrine of CAÑÁDE, who taught that souls, numerous and infinite, are of themselves insensible; and mind, the soul’s instrument, is minute as an atom, and by itself likewise unsentient. The union of one soul with a mind would not exclude its association with other souls, equally infinite and ubiquitous; and all, therefore, would partake of the same feeling of pain or pleasure.’

The fourth chapter of the second book proceeds in the task of reconciling apparent contradictions of passages in the *védas*.§

‘The corporeal organs of sense and of action, designated by the term *prān’a* in a secondary acceptation (it is noticed in its proper signification further on, § 4), have, like the elements and other objects treated of in the foregoing chapter, a similar origin, as modifications of BRAHME; although unnoticed in some passages concerning the creation, and mentioned in others as pre-existent, but expressly affirmed in others to be successively evolved.§ The deficiency or omission of one text does not invalidate the explicit tenour of another.

* *Br. Sūtr.* § 17. (S. 43-53.)

† *Rīgvéda*, 8. 4. 17. *Yajurvéda* (*Vájasaneyi*) 31. 3.

‡ *Sāncara* cites by this name the *Bhagavad Gíta*.

§ *Br. Sūtr.* 2. 4. § 1. (S. 1-4.)

‘In various passages, the number of corporeal organs is differently stated, from seven to thirteen. The precise number is, however, eleven :* the five senses, sight, &c. ; five active organs, the hand, &c. ; and lastly, the internal faculty, mind, comprehending intelligence, consciousness, and sensation. Where a greater number is specified, the term is employed in its most comprehensive sense ; where fewer are mentioned, it is used in a more restricted acceptation : thus seven sensitive organs are spoken of, relatively to the eyes, ears, and nostrils (in pairs), and the tongue.’

‘They are finite and small : not, however, minute as atoms, nor yet gross, as the coarser elements.†

‘In its primary or principal signification, *prán'a* is vital action, and chiefly respiration. This, too, is a modification of BRAHME. It is not wind (*váyu*) or the air which is breathed, though so described in numerous passages of the *védas* and other authorities ; nor is it an operation of a corporeal organ ; but it is a particular vital act, and comprehends five such : 1st respiration, or an act operating upwards ; 2d inspiration, one operating downwards ; 3d a vigorous action, which is a mean between the foregoing two ; 4th expiration, or passage upwards, as in metempsychosis ; 5th digestion, or circulation of nutriment throughout the corporeal frame.‡

‘Here, too, it must be understood of a limited, not vast or infinite act, nor minutely small. The vital act is not so minute as not to pervade the entire frame, as in the instance of circulation of nourishment ; yet is small enough to be imperceptible to a bystander, in the instance of life’s passage in transmigration.

‘Respiration and the rest of the vital acts do not take effect of themselves by an intrinsic faculty, but as influenced and directed by a presiding deity and ruling power, yet relatively to a particular body, to whose animating spirit, and not to the presiding deity, fruition accrues.§

‘The senses and organs, eleven in number as above mentioned, are not modifications of the principal vital act, respiration, but distinct principles.||

‘It is the supreme ruler, not the individual soul, who is described in passages of the *védas* as transforming himself into divers combinations, assuming various names and shapes, deemed terrene, aqueous, or igneous,

* *Br. Sûtr.* 2. 4. § 2. (S. 5-6.) † *Ibid.* § 3. (S. 7.) ‡ *Ibid.* § 4. (S. 8.) § 5. (S. 9-12.) § 6. (S. 13.)
§ *Ibid.* § 7. (S. 14-16.) || *Ibid.* § 8. (S. 17-19.)

according to the predominancy of the one or the other element. When nourishment is received into the corporeal frame, it undergoes a threefold distribution, according to its fineness or coarseness: corn and other terrene food becomes flesh; but the coarser portion is ejected, and the finer nourishes the mental organ. Water is converted into blood; the coarser particles are rejected as urine; the finer supports the breath. Oil or other combustible substance, deemed igneous, becomes marrow; the coarser part is deposited as bone, and the finer supplies the faculty of speech.*

The third lecture treats on the means whereby knowledge is attainable, through which liberation and perpetual bliss may be achieved: and, as preliminary thereto, on the passage of the soul furnished with organs into the versatile world and its various conditions; and on the nature and attributes of the supreme being.

‘The soul is subject to transmigration. It passes from one state to another, invested with a subtile frame consisting of elementary particles, the seed or rudiment of a grosser body. Departing from that which it occupied, it ascends to the moon; where, clothed with an aqueous form, it experiences the recompense of its works; and whence it returns to occupy a new body with resulting influence of its former deeds. But evil-doers suffer for their misdeeds in the seven appointed regions of retribution.†

‘The returning soul quits its watery frame in the lunar orb, and passes successively and rapidly through ether, air, vapour, mist, and cloud, into rain; and thus finds its way into a vegetating plant, and thence, through the medium of nourishment, into an animal embryo.‡

In the second chapter of this lecture the states or conditions of the embodied soul are treated of. They are chiefly three; waking, dreaming, and profound sleep: to which may be added for a fourth, that of death; and for a fifth, that of trance, swoon, or stupor, which is intermediate between profound sleep and death (as it were half-dead), as dreaming is between waking and profound sleep. In that middle state of dreaming there is a fanciful course of events, an illusory creation, which however testifies the existence of a conscious soul. In profound sleep the soul has retired to the supreme one by the route of the arteries of the pericardium.§

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the consideration of the

* *Br. Sūtr.* 2. 4. § 9. (S. 20-22.)

† *Ibid.* 3. 1. § 1-3. (S. 1-7 and 8-11 and 12-21.)

‡ *Ibid.* 3. 1. § 4-6. (S. 22-23 and 24-27.)

§ *Ibid.* 3. 2. § 1-4. (S. 1-6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.)

nature and attributes of the supreme being. 'He is described in many passages of the *véda*, as diversified and endued with every quality and particular character; but in other and very numerous texts, as without form or quality. The latter only is truly applicable, not the former, nor yet both. He is impassible, unaffected by worldly modifications; as the clear crystal, seemingly coloured by the red blossom of a hibiscus, is not the less really pellucid. He does not vary with every disguising form or designation, for all diversity is expressly denied by explicit texts; and the notion of variableness relative to him is distinctly condemned in some *s'ác'hás* of the *véda*.*

'He is neither coarse nor subtile, neither long nor short, neither audible nor tangible; amorphous, invariable.'

'This luminous immortal being, who is in this earth, is the same with the luminous, immortal, embodied spirit, which informs the corporeal self, and is the same with the [supreme] soul.' 'He is to be apprehended by mind alone, there is not here any multiplicity. Whosoever views him as manifold dies death after death.†

'He is amorphous, for so he is explicitly declared to be; but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moonlight, impinging on an object, appears straight or crooked.‡

'He is pronounced to be sheer sense, mere intellect and thought: as a lump of salt is wholly of an uniform taste within and without, so is the soul an entire mass of intelligence.' 'This is affirmed both in the *védas* and in the *smṛitis*: and, as such, he is compared to the reflected images of sun and moon, which fluctuate with the rise and fall of the waters that reflect them.§ 'The luminous sun, though single, yet reflected in water, becomes various; and so does the unborn divine soul by disguise in divers modes.'

The *véda* so describes him, as entering into and pervading the corporeal shapes by himself wrought.|| 'He framed bodies, biped and quadruped; and becoming a bird, he passed into those bodies, filling them as their informing spirit.'

In the *Vṛihad aran'yaca*, after premising two modes of BRAHME, morpious and amorphous; one composed of the three coarser elements, earth, water,

* *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. § 5. (S. 11-13.)

† Passages of the *véda* cited among others by the scholiasts commenting on the above.

‡ *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. (S. 14.)

§ *Ibid.* S. 15-20.

|| *Ibid.* S. 21.

and fire ; the other consisting of the two more subtle, air and ether ; it is said, ‘next then his name is propounded,’ “neither so nor so ; for there is none other but he, and he is the supreme.” Here the finite forms premised are denied ; for his existence as the supreme being is repeatedly affirmed in this and in other passages.*

‘He is imperceptible ; yet during devout meditation is, as it were, apprehended by perception and inference, through revelation and authentic recollections.†

‘Like the sun and other luminaries, seemingly multiplied by reflection though really single, and like ether (space) apparently subdivided in vessels containing it within limits, the (supreme) light is without difference or distinction of particulars, for he is repeatedly declared so to be.‡ Therefore is one, who knows the truth, identified with the infinite being ; for so revelation indicates. But since both are affirmed, the relation is as that of the coiled serpent fancied to be a hoop ; or as that of light and the luminary from which it proceeds, for both are luminous.§

‘There is none other but he, notwithstanding the apparent import of divers texts, which seem to imply differences, various relations, and aliquot parts. He is ubiquitary and eternal ; for he is pronounced to be greater than etherial space, which is infinite.||

‘The fruit or recompense of works is from him, for that is congruous ; and so it is expressly affirmed in the *védas*. JAİMİNĪ alleges virtue or moral merit ; but the author of the *sūtras* (BĀDARĀYANA VYĀSA) maintains the former, because the supreme being is in the *védas* termed the cause of virtue and of vice, as of every thing else.’¶

The two last chapters of the third lecture relate chiefly to devout exercises and pious meditation, the practice of which is inculcated as proper and requisite to prepare the soul and mind for the reception of divine knowledge, and to promote its attainment. I pass rapidly over this copious part** of the text, for the same reason for which I restricted myself to a very brief notice of the *Yōga* or theistical *Sānc’hya* of *Patanjali* ; because religious observances are more concerned than philosophy with the

* *Br. Sūtr.* 3. 2. § 6. (S. 22.)

† *Ibid.* S. 23-24.

‡ *Ibid.* S. 25.

§ *Ibid.* S. 26-30.

|| *Ibid.* § 7.

¶ *Ibid.* § 8.

** The third chapter contains thirty-six sections, comprising sixty-six aphorisms ; the fourth includes eighteen, comprehending fifty-two *sūtras* ; and the subject is pursued in the eight first sections of the fourth lecture.

topics there treated, and the ritual of the *Yōga* according to both systems, *Sānc'hya* and *Védānta*, would be a fitter subject of a separate treatise, rather than to be incidentally touched on while investigating the philosophical doctrines of both schools.

Various questions arise on the modes, forms, and object of meditation taught in the *Upanishads* and in other portions of the *Vēdas*, as well as on exterior observances either immediately or mediately connected therewith, and likewise on the direct efficacy of knowledge, which are all considered and solved at much length. In general, but not always, the same divine knowledge, the same worship, and like meditations, are intended by the same designations in different *vēdas*, the omissions and obscurities of one being supplied and explained by another, and even under various designations. By the acquisition of such knowledge, attainable as it is in the present or in a future birth, in lifetime, or to take effect after death, the influence of works is annulled, and consequent deliverance is single, not varying in degree and inducing different gradations of bliss, but complete and final happiness.

The fourth lecture relates chiefly to the fruit and effect of pious meditation properly conducted, and the consequent attainment of divine knowledge. The beginning of the first chapter is, however, supplemental to the foregoing lecture, treating of devout exercises, and the posture (a sitting one) in which devotion and contemplation should be practised, with constant repetition of those observances, and persisting therein during life.*

So soon as that knowledge is attained, past sin is annulled and future offence precluded.† “As water wets not the leaf of the lotus, so sin touches not him who knows God: as the floss on the carding comb cast into the fire is consumed, so are his sins burnt away.”‡

‘In like manner, the effect of the converse (that is, of merit and virtue) is by acquisition of knowledge annulled and precluded. It is at death that these consequences take place.§ “He traverses both (merit and demerit) thereby.”|| “The heart’s knot is broken, all doubts are split, and his works perish, when he has seen the supreme being.”¶ “All sins

* *Br. Sūtr.* 4. 1. § 1-8 (S. 1-12.)

§ *Br. S.* 4. 1. § 10. (S. 14.)

† *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 13.)

|| *Frīhad Aranyaca.*

‡ *Ch'hándōgya, Brahme vidyā.*

¶ *Mun'daca.*

depart from him:”* meaning good works as well as misdeeds; for the confinement of fetters is the same, whether the chain be of gold or iron.†

‘ But only such antecedent sin and virtue are annulled, as had not begun to have effect: for their influence lasts until his deliverance, and then does he merge in the supreme BRAHME.‡ Those which were in operation are not annulled, as the arrow, which has been shot, completes its flight, nor falls till its speed is spent; and the potter’s wheel, once set in motion, whirls till the velocity which has been communicated to it is exhausted.’

‘ However, the maintenance of a perpetual fire, and certain other religious observances enjoined as conducive to the same end, are not rendered inefficacious;§ for it is declared that “*Bráhmaṇas* seek divine knowledge by holy study, sacrifice, liberality, and devotion:”|| and according to some *s’ác’has*¶ of the *véda*, other merits remain likewise effectual; for sons succeed to the inheritance of their father’s works; the affectionate share his good deeds; and the malignant participate of his ill actions.” These sacrificial observances may be such as are conjoined with devout exercises, faith, and pious meditation; or unattended by those holy practices for attainment of divine knowledge, since they are pronounced most efficacious when so conjoined, which implies that they are not wholly inoperative by themselves.’**

‘ Having annulled by fruition other works which had begun to have effect, having enjoyed the recompense and suffered the pains of good and bad actions, the possessor of divine knowledge, on demise of the body, proceeds to a reunion with BRAHME.††

The fruit of divine knowledge having been shown in the first chapter, the second chapter of this lecture treats of the particular effect of devout exercises joined with appropriate meditation. It chiefly concerns the ascent of the soul, or mode in which it passes from the body.

‘ Of a dying person the speech, followed by the rest of the ten exterior faculties (not the corporeal organs themselves), is absorbed into the mind, for the action of the outer organ ceases before the mind’s. This, in like

* *Ch’hándógya*.

† Anon. com.

‡ *Br. Sútr.* 4. 1. § 11. (S. 15.) *Ch’hándógya*.

§ *Ibid.* § 12. (S. 16-17.)

|| *Vrihad Aran’yaca*.

¶ *Satyáyana*.

** *Br. Sútr.* 4. 1. § 13. (S. 18.) *Ch’hándógya*.

†† *Ibid.* § 14. (S. 19.) *Ch’hándógya* and *Vrihad Aran’yaca*.

manner, retires into the breath,* attended likewise by all the other vital functions, for they are life's companions; and the same retreat of the mind is observable, also, in profound sleep and in a swoon. Breath, attended likewise by all other vital faculties, is withdrawn into the living soul which governs the corporeal organs, as the attendants of a king assemble around him when he is setting out upon a journey; for all vital functions gather about the soul at the last moment when it is expiring.† The living soul, attended with all its faculties, retires within a rudiment of body, composed of light with the rest of the five elements, in a subtile state. "Breath" is, therefore, said to withdraw into "light;" not meaning that element (or fire) exclusively; nor intending direct transition, for a traveller has gone from one city to another, though he passed through an intermediate town.‡

‘ This retirement from the body is common to ordinary uninformed people as to the devout contemplative worshipper, until they proceed further on their respective paths; and immortality (without immediate reunion with the supreme BRAHME) is the fruit of pious meditation, though impediments may not be wholly consumed and removed.‡

‘ In that condition the soul of the contemplative worshipper remains united to a subtile elementary frame, conjoined with the vital faculties, until the dissolution of worlds, when it merges in the supreme deity. That elementary frame is minute in its dimensions as subtile in its texture, and is accordingly imperceptible to bystanders when departing from the body: nor is it oppressed by cremation or other treatment which that body undergoes. It is by its warmth sensible so long as it abides with that coarser frame, which becomes cold in death when it has departed,§ and was warm during life while it remained.

‘ But he who has attained the true knowledge of God does not pass through the same stages of retreat, proceeding directly to reunion with the supreme being, with which he is identified, as a river, at its confluence with the sea, merges therein altogether. His vital faculties and the elements of which his body consists, all the sixteen component parts which constitute the human frame, are absorbed absolutely and completely: both name and form cease; and he becomes immortal, without parts or members.’||

* *Ch'hándógya. Br. Sûtr. 4. 2. § 1-3.*

† *Trihad Aran'yaca.*

‡ *Br. Sûtr. 4. 2. § 4. (S. 7.)*

§ *Ibid. § 5. (S. 8-11.) Cathavalli, &c.*

|| *Ibid. § 6-8. (S. 12-16.) Cān'va. Mādhyandīna. Pras'n'a. &c.*

In course of expounding the text, some of the commentators compare the ultimate absorption of the vital faculties to the disappearance of water sprinkled on a hot stone.* They seem to be unaware of its evaporation, and consider it to have sunk into the stone.

‘The soul, together with the vital faculties absorbed in it, having retired within its proper abode, the heart, the summit of that viscus flashes, and lightens the passage by which the soul is to depart: the crown of the head in the case of the wise; and any other part of the body, in the instance of the ignorant. A hundred and one arteries issue from the heart, one of which passes to the crown of the head: it is named *sushumna*. By that passage, in virtue of acquired knowledge, and of recollection of the meditated way, the soul of the wise, graced by the favour of BRAHME, whose dwelling is in the heart, issues and meets a solar ray; and by that route proceeds, whether it be night or day, winter or summer.† The contact of a sunbeam with the vein is constant, as long as the body endures: rays of light reach from the sun to the vein, and conversely extend from this to the sun. The preferableness of summer, as exemplified in the case of BHISHMA, who awaited the return of that auspicious season to die, does not concern the devout worshipper, who has practised religious exercises in contemplation of BRAHME, as inculcated by the *védas*, and has consequently acquired knowledge. But it does concern those who have followed the observances taught by the *Sānc’hya Yóga*; according to which, the time of day and season of the year are not indifferent.

The further progress of the soul, from the termination of the coronal artery communicating with a solar ray to its final destination, the abode of BRAHME, is variously described in divers texts of the *véda*; some specifying intermediate stations which are omitted by others, or mentioned in a different order.‡ The seeming discrepancies of those passages are reconciled, and all are shown to relate to one uniform route, deduced from the text, for the divine journey (*déva-yána*) which the liberated soul travels. A question arises, whether the intermediate stations, which are mentioned, be stages of the journey, or scenes of fruition to be visited in succession, or

* *Ranganátha* on *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. 6. (S. 12.)

† *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. § 9-11. (S. 17-21.) *Vri. Aran’. Ch’hándógya*, &c.

‡ *Ch’hándógya*, *Caushítaci*, *Vrihad Aran’yaca*, &c.

landmarks designated for the course and direction of the route.* On this point the settled conclusion is,† that the presiding deities or regents of the places or regions indicated are guides to the soul, who forward it on its way in its helpless condition, destitute of exerted organs, all its faculties being absorbed and withdrawn; as a blind man is led, or a faint person is conducted, by a guide.

The route deduced from the tenour of texts compared, and from divers considerations set forth,‡ is by a solar ray to the realm of fire; thence to the regents of day, of the semilunation, of the summer six months, of the year; and thence to the abode of gods; to air or wind, the regent of which forwards the journeying soul from his precincts, by a narrow passage compared to the nave of a chariot wheel, towards the sun: thence the transition is to the moon, whence to the region of lightning, above which is the realm of VARÚNA, the regent of water; for lightning and thunder are beneath the rain-cloud and aqueous region: the rest of the way is by the ealm of INDRA, to the abode of PRAJÁPATI or BRAHME.

A question arises, which is here discussed, whether BRAHME, to whose dwelling and court the soul is conducted, be the supreme being, according to the ordinary and chief acceptation of the term, or be that effect of his creative will which is distinguished as *cárya brahme*, identified with the mythological personage entitled HIRAN'YAGARBHA, as having been included within the golden mundane egg. JAIMINI affirms the supreme one to be meant: but BĀDARI maintains the other opinion; which is that which the commentators of the *sútras* understand the author of them to adopt.‡

The souls of those holy persons only, whose devout meditation was addressed to the pure BRAHME himself, take the route described;§ not those whose contemplation was partial and restrictive: they have their special reward. Those, too, whose knowledge of God was more perfect, pass immediately, or by any route, to a reunion with the divinity, with whom they are identified.

The soul of him who has arrived at the perfection of divine knowledge, and is consequently liberated, "quitting its corporeal frame, ascends to the

* BHAVADEVVA instances *Pátalipura* and the *Són'a* river, as indicated for the direction of the route from *Tirabhucti* (Tirhút) to *Váránasi* (Benares). It is clear that he understands *Pátalipura* (the ancient Palibothra) to be Patna.

† *Br. Sútr.* 4. 3. § 1-4. (S. 1-6.) ‡ *Ibid.* § 5. (S. 7-14.) § *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 15-16.)

supreme light which is BRAHME, and comes forth identified with him, conform and undivided;”* as pure water, dropped into the limpid lake, is such as that is.

Concerning the condition of the liberated man, a difference of doctrine is noticed.† JAİMİNĪ maintained, that he is endued with divine attributes, omniscience, ubiquitary power, and other transcendent faculties. AUDULÓMĪ insisted, that he becomes sheer thought, sentient intelligence. The author of the *sūtras* (BĀDARĀYAN’A) accedes to the last-mentioned opinion; admitting, however, the practical or apparent possession of divine faculties by one who has attained perfection of knowledge.

‘By certain devout exercises and meditation‡ a less perfect knowledge is acquired, which, as before mentioned, qualifies the possessor of it for reception at BRAHME’S abode, though not for immediate reunion and identity with his being. In that condition transcendent power is enjoyed. The *pitrīs*, or shades of progenitors, may be called up by a simple act of the will; and other superhuman faculties may be similarly exerted. The possessor of these is independent, subject to no other’s control. He may, at his option, be invested with one or more bodies, furnished with senses and organs, or be unincumbered with a corporeal frame. On this point, however, a difference of doctrine subsists. JAİMİNĪ maintained the indispensable presence of body; BĀDARĪ, its absence; and the author (BĀDARĀYAN’A) admits the option. In one case, the condition is that of a person dreaming; in the other case, as of one awake.§

‘Master of several bodies, by a simple act of his will, the *Yógī* does not occupy one only, leaving the rest inanimate, like so many wooden machines. He may animate more than one, in like manner as a single lamp may be made to supply more than one wick.||

Liberation (*mucti*), besides its proper and strict sense, which is that of final deliverance through a perfect knowledge of BRAHME, and consequent identification with the divinity and absorption into his essence, is likewise employed in a secondary acceptation for that which takes effect in life-time (*jivan-mucti*); or which conducts the soul after death to dwell with BRAHME; not, however, divested of a subtile corporeal frame. The more complete

* *Br. Sūtr.* 4. 4. § 1-2. (S. 1-4.)

† *Ibid.* § 3. (S. 5-7.)

‡ *Hārda vidyā* or *Dahara-vidyā* in the *Ch’hándōgya*.

§ *Br. Sūtr.* 4. 4. § 4. 5. (S. 9-14.)

|| *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 15-16.)

deliverance is incorporeal (*vidéha mukti*).* The less perfect liberation appertains to a *Yógi*, similar, in respect of the faculties and powers possessed by him, to one who has accomplished the like by the observances taught in the *Sanc'hya* or *Yóga* of PÁTANJALI.

Such a *Yógi*, uncontrolled and independent as he has been pronounced to be, can exert every faculty and superior power analogous to that of the divinity's, which may be conducive to enjoyment; but he has not a creative power. His faculties are transcendent for enjoyment, not for action.†

The more perfect liberation is absolute and final: there is no return of the soul from its absorption in the divine essence, to undergo further transmigrations as before.‡ But incomplete knowledge, which conducts to BRAHME's abode without qualifying the soul for such absorption into the divinity, exempts it from return during the subsisting *calpa*; but not at a future renovation of worlds,§ unless by special favour of the deity.

Recapitulation.

In the foregoing summary of the *Védánta* from the *sútras* of VYÁSA, the interpretation by S'ANCARA has been relied upon; and his gloss, with notes of his annotators and the commentaries of scholiasts who follow him, have been exclusively employed, lest the doctrine of separate schools and different branches of the *Védánta* should be blended and confounded. Those commentaries are numerous, and explanations and elucidations of the text have been taken from one or from another indiscriminately, as they have been found pertinent and illustrative, without particular preference or selection. This should be borne in mind in comparing that summary with its authorities, as it has not been judged necessary, nor generally practicable, to cite the particular commentary that is especially used in each instance.

Some remarks will be now added, in which other authorities are likewise employed, and chiefly the elementary works|| mentioned in the introduction of this essay.

The principal and essential tenets of the *Védánta* are, that God is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the existence, continuance, and dissolution of the universe. Creation is an act of his will. He is both

* *Bhavadéva* on *Br. Sútr.* 4. 4. S. 22.

† *Br. Sútr.* 4. 4. § 7. (S. 17-22.)

‡ *Ibid.* S. 22.

§ On this point the commentators do not appear to agree.

|| *Védánta-sára*, *Védánta-paribhášá*, &c.

efficient and material cause of the world : creator and nature, framer and frame, doer and deed. At the consummation of all things, all are resolved into him : as the spider spins his thread from his own substance and gathers it in again ; as vegetables sprout from the soil and return to it, earth to earth ; as hair and nails grow from a living body and continue with it. The supreme being is one, sole-existent, secondless, entire, without parts, sempiternal, infinite, ineffable, invariable ruler of all, universal soul, truth, wisdom, intelligence, happiness.

Individual souls, emanating from the supreme one, are likened to innumerable sparks issuing from a blazing fire. From him they proceed, and to him they return, being of the same essence. The soul, which governs the body, together with its organs, neither is born ; nor does it die. It is a portion of the divine substance ; and, as such, infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient, true.

It is governed by the supreme. Its activity is not of its essence, but inductive through its organs : as an artisan, taking his tools, labours and undergoes toil and pain, but laying them aside reposes ; so is the soul active, and a sufferer by means of its organs ; but, divested of them, and returning to the supreme one, is at rest and is happy. It is not a free and independent agent, but made to act by the supreme one, who causes it to do in one state as it had purposed in a former condition. According to its predisposition for good or evil, for enjoined or forbidden deeds, it is made to do good or ill, and thus it has retribution for previous works. Yet God is not author of evil ; for so it has been from eternity : the series of preceding forms and of dispositions manifested in them has been infinite.

The soul is incased in body as in a sheath, or rather in a succession of sheaths. The first or inner case is the intellectual one (*vijnyānamaya*) : it is composed of the sheer (*tan-mātra*), or simple elements uncombined, and consists of the intellect (*buddhi*) joined with the five senses.

The next is the mental (*manómaya*) sheath, in which mind is joined with the preceding. A third sheath or case comprises the organs of action and the vital faculties, and is termed the organic or vital case. These three sheaths (*cós'a*) constitute the subtle frame (*súcshma-s'aríra* or *linga-s'aríra*) which attends the soul in its transmigrations. The interior rudiment confined to the inner case is the causal frame (*cáran'a-s'aríra*).

The gross body (*st'húla-s'aríra*) which it animates from birth to death in any step of its transmigrations, is composed of the coarse elements, formed

by combinations of the simple elements, in proportions of four-eighths of the predominant and characteristic one with an eighth of each of the other four: that is, the particles of the several elements, being divisible, are, in the first place, split into moieties; whereof one is subdivided into quarters; and the remaining moiety combines with one part (a quarter of a moiety) from each of the four others, thus constituting coarse or mixed elements.* The exterior case, composed of elements so combined, is the nutrimentitious (*annamaya*) sheath; and being the scene of coarse fruition, is therefore termed the gross body.

The organic frame assimilates the combined elements received in food, and secretes the finer particles and rejects the coarsest: earth becomes flesh; water, blood; and inflammable substances (oil or grease), marrow. The coarser particles of the two first are excreted as feces and urine; those of the third are deposited in the bones. The finer particles of the one nourish the mind; of the other, supply respiration; of the third, support speech.

Organized bodies are arranged by the *védántins* in either four or three classes: for both which arrangements the authority of passages of the *véda* is cited. Their four classes are the same with those of other writers; but the threefold division appears to be peculiar to this school. It is, 1st. viviparous (*jívaja*), as man and quadrupeds; 2d. oviparous (*an'd'aja*), as birds and insects; 3d. germiniparous (*udbhijja*).† The latter, however, comprehends the two terminating classes of the fourfold distribution, vermin and vegetable; differing but as one sprouts from the earth, the other pullulates from water: the one fixed, the other locomotive. To both, equivocal and spontaneous generation, or propagation without union of parents, is assigned.

The order in which the five elements are enumerated is that of their development: 1st. the ethereal element (*ácás'a*), which is deemed a most subtile fluid, occupying all space and confounded with vacancy: sound is its particular quality. 2d. Wind (*váyu*), or air in motion: for mobility is its characteristic; sound and feel are sensible in it. 3d. Fire or light (*téjas*), of which heat is the characteristic; and by which sound, feel, and colour (or form) are made manifest. 4th. Water (*ap*), of which fluidity is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, and taste occur. 5th. Earth (*prithiví* or *anna*), of which hardness is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, taste, and smell are discernible.

* *Véd. Sára.* 136.

† *Sanc., &c. on Br. Sútr.* 3. 1. § 3. (S. 21.)

The notion of ether and wind as distinct elements, an opinion which this has in common with most of the other schools of Indian philosophy, seems to originate in the assumption of mobility for the essential character of the one. Hence air in motion has been distinguished from the aerial fluid at rest, which is *ácás'a*, supposed to penetrate and pervade all worldly space ; and, by an easy transition, *váyu* (wind) and motion, come to be identified, as *ácás'a* (ether) and space likewise are confounded.

An organized body, in its most subtile state of tenuity, comprises sixteen members (*avyaya*) or corporeal parts, *viz.* five organs of sense, as many instruments of action, and the same number of vital faculties ; to which are added mind (including intelligence, consciousness, and sensation) ; or, distinguishing mind and intellect (*buddhi*) as separate parts, the number is seventeen.

The vital faculties, termed *váyu*, are not properly air or wind, but vital functions or actions. Considered, however, with a reference to the proper meaning of that term, they are by some explained to be, 1st respiration, which is ascending, and of which the seat is the nostril ; 2d, inspiration (or otherwise explained, flatus), which is descending, and which issues from the lower extremity of the intestine ; 3d, flatuousness, which is diffused through the body, passing by all the veins and arteries ; 4th, expiration, ascending from the throat ; 5th, digestion, or abdominal air, of which the seat is the middle of the body.

According to a different explanation, the first is respiration ; the second, inspiration ; the third, a mean between the two, pulsation, palpitation, and other vital movements ; the fourth is expiration ; and the fifth is digestion.

Three states of the soul in respect of the body are recognized ; to which must be added a fourth, and even a fifth, *viz.* waking, dreaming, profoundly sleeping, half-dead, and dead. While awake, the soul, associated with body, is active under the guidance of providence, and has to do with a real (*páramárt'hi*) and practical (*vyavahárici*) creation. In a dream there is an illusory (*máyámayi*) and unreal creation : nevertheless, dreams prognosticate events. Dreaming is the mean (*sandhya*) between sleeping and waking. In profound sleep the soul is absent, having retired by the channel of the arteries, and being as it were enfolded in the supreme deity. It is not, however, blended with the divine essence, as a drop of water fallen into a lake, where it becomes undistinguishable ; but, on the contrary, the soul continues discriminate, and returns unchanged to the body which it ani-

mates while awake. Swoon, or stupor, is intermediate between sleep and death. During insensibility produced by accident or disease, there is, as in profound sleep and lethargy, a temporary absence of the soul. In death it has absolutely quitted its gross corporeal frame.

Subject to future transmigration, it visits other worlds, to receive there the recompense of works or suffer the penalty of misdeeds. Sinners fall to various regions of punishment, administered by CHITRAGUPTA and other mythological persons in the realm of YAMA. The virtuous rise to the moon, where they enjoy the fruit of their good actions; and whence they return to this world to animate new bodies, and act in them, under providence, conformably with their propensities and predispositions, the trace of which remains.

The wise, liberated from worldly trammels, ascend yet higher, to the abode and court of BRAHME; or, if their attainment of wisdom be complete, they at once pass into a reunion with the divine essence.

Three degrees of liberation or deliverance (*mucti*) are distinguished: one incorporeal, which is that last-mentioned, and is complete; another imperfect, which is that before-mentioned, taking effect upon demise, when the soul passes to the highest heaven, the abode of BRAHME. The third is effectual in life-time (*jivan mucti*), and enables the possessor of it to perform supernatural actions; as evocation of shades of progenitors, translation of himself into other bodies called into existence by the mere force of his will, instantaneous removal to any place at his pleasure, and other wondrous performances.

These several degrees of deliverance are achieved by means of certain sacrifices, as that of a horse (*aśwamedha*), or by religious exercises in various prescribed modes, together with pious meditation on the being and attributes of GOD: but the highest degree of it is attainable only by perfect knowledge of the divine nature, and of the identity of GOD with that which emanated from him, or was created of his substance and partakes of his essence.

Questions most recondite, which are agitated by theologians, have engaged the attention of the *védāntins* likewise, and have been by them discussed at much length; such as free-will (*swātantrya*), divine grace (*īśwara-prasāda*), efficacy of works (*carman*) or of faith (*śradhā*), and many other abstruse points.

On the last-mentioned topic, that of faith, nothing will be found in the

text of BĀDARĀYAṆA, and little in the gloss of S'ANCARA. Its paramount efficacy is a tenet of another branch of the *Védānta* school, which follows the authority of the *Bhagavad-gītā*. In that work, as in many of the *Purāṇas*, passages relative to this topic recur at every turn.

The *fruit of works* is the grand subject of the first *mīmāṃsā*, which treats of religious duties, sacrifices, and other observances.

The latter *mīmāṃsā* more particularly maintains the doctrine of *divine grace*. It treats of *free-will*, which it in effect denies; but endeavours to reconcile the existence of moral evil under the government of an all-wise, all-powerful, and benevolent providence, with the absence of free-will, by assuming the past eternity of the universe, and the infinite renewals of worlds into which every individual being has brought the predispositions contracted by him in earlier states, and so retrospectively without beginning or limit.

The notion, that the versatile world is an illusion (*māyā*), that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the *Védānta*. I have remarked nothing which countenances it in the *sūtras* of VYĀSA nor in the gloss of S'ANCARA, but much concerning it in the minor commentaries and in elementary treatises. I take it to be no tenet of the original *Védāntin* philosophy, but of another branch, from which later writers have borrowed it, and have intermixed and confounded the two systems. The doctrine of the early *Védānta* is complete and consistent, without this graft of a later growth.